Optimal Data Attacks on Power Grids: Leveraging Detection & Measurement
  Jamming by Deka, Deepjyoti et al.
Optimal Data Attacks on Power Grids:
Leveraging Detection & Measurement Jamming
Deepjyoti Deka, Ross Baldick and Sriram Vishwanath
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin
Email: deepjyotideka@utexas.edu, baldick@ece.utexas.edu, sriram@ece.utexas.edu
Abstract—Meter measurements in the power grid are suscep-
tible to manipulation by adversaries, that can lead to errors
in state estimation. This paper presents a general framework
to study attacks on state estimation by adversaries capable of
injecting bad-data into measurements and further, of jamming
their reception. Through these two techniques, a novel ‘detectable
jamming’ attack is designed that changes the state estimation
despite failing bad-data detection checks. Compared to commonly
studied ‘hidden’ data attacks, these attacks have lower costs and a
wider feasible operating region. It is shown that the entire domain
of jamming costs can be divided into two regions, with distinct
graph-cut based formulations for the design of the optimal attack.
The most significant insight arising from this result is that the
adversarial capability to jam measurements changes the optimal
’detectable jamming’ attack design only if the jamming cost
is less than half the cost of bad-data injection. A polynomial
time approximate algorithm for attack vector construction is
developed and its efficacy in attack design is demonstrated
through simulations on IEEE test systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
As power grids around the world move towards smarter
devices and distributed control, it has led to large scale
placement of cyber meters like PMUs [1] for real-time data
collection. This can have a variety of positive implications for
the grid, notably monitoring of the grid state for improved reli-
ability and optimal electricity prices. However, ‘smart’ meters
and associated communication infrastructure are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks by rogue agents and online viruses.
Examples of these attacks include GPS spoofing attack on
PMUs [4], ‘Dragonfly’ virus [2], Arora test attack [3] among
others. Such data attacks can lead to incorrect estimation of
the grid state and result to large scale blackouts. The extreme
consequences of adversarial attacks and counter strategies has
attracted significant interest from the research community. [5]
first introduced the problem of undetectable data attacks that
bypass standard bad-data tests present in the state estimator.
The optimal attack vector comprising of the compromised
measurements is constructed in [5] using projection matrices.
Subsequent work has looked at the problem of constructing
the optimal attack under different grid conditions and adver-
sarial objectives. Attack construction that require minimum
number of measurement corruptions are presented in [6] using
l0−l1 relaxation. Reference [7] analyzed a system with phasor
measurements and used mixed integer linear programming to
create the optimal attack. For systems with phasor and line
flow measurements and PMUs, [8], [9] discusses graph cut
based attack designs on specific buses on the grid and associ-
ated protection strategies. Similarly, other protection schemes
have been discussed in literature, including heuristic protection
schemes [10], greedy schemes [6], [9] among others.
It is worth noting that most research on power grid cyber-
security has focussed on designing ‘hidden’ attack vectors that
completely evade the bad-data detection tests at the grid’s
state estimator. However, the authors of [11] showed that data
‘framing’ attacks can be constructed that changes the values in
half of the measurements in the attack vector while damaging
the other half. The attack is initially detected by the estimator
but becomes feasible after the bad-data identifier removes the
damaged measurements. In [12], a generalized ‘detectable’
attack model was presented for systems where a subset of the
measurements are incorruptible. The authors in [12] showed
that by focussing on the bad-data identifier, the cardinality
of the optimal ‘detectable’ data attack in most cases can be
reduced by greater than 50% (50% in worst case) of that
of ‘hidden’ attacks. More importantly, the ‘detectable’ attack
framework in [12] is shown to produce feasible attacks in op-
erating regimes that are secure against ‘hidden’ attacks. In this
work, we consider the ‘detectable’ attack framework in [12]
but with one major modification to the adversary’s capability.
In addition to modifying insecure measurements (bad-data
injection) as described in previous work, the adversary con-
sidered here is capable of jamming or blocking measurement
communication to the state estimator. Note that measurement
jamming can be conducted using commercial jammers (for
wireless communication), Denial of Service attack [13] or by
physically damaging the communication channel. Compared to
bad-data injection that requires measurements to be changed
by precise real values, measurement jamming is in fact less
resource-intensive. One can make the realistic assumption that
the non-negative cost of jamming lies in the range between 0
and the cost of injecting bad-data into a measurement.
The overarching goal of this work is thus to study the
impact of adding measurement jamming to the adversary’s
arsenal on the design of the optimal ‘detectable’ data attacks.
Here, we formulate the optimal attack vector design as a graph
cut problem based on the necessary and sufficient conditions
for feasibility. We show that the entire range of values for
measurement jamming cost can be divided into two intervals
with different optimal attack formulations that lead to two
distinct design strategies. Specifically, we prove that mea-
surement jamming significantly alters the optimal ‘detectable’
attack design only if the jamming cost is less than half the
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Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus test system [14]
cost of data-injection. In contrast, we show that for ‘hidden’
data attacks, measurement jamming leads to a single simple
attack strategy independent of the jamming cost. We provide
recursive min-cut based algorithms to design the optimal
attack over the entire range of jamming cost values and show
the cost improvement derived from measurement jamming
through simulations on IEEE test cases [14]. By discussing
the scope of measurement jamming as an adversarial strategy,
our work thus provides a potent and realistic generalization of
current data attack frameworks. Finally, we show that number
of incorruptible measurements needed to prevent ‘detectable’
attacks scales at least with the total number of measurements.
This is much higher than ‘hidden’ attacks where the security
needs scale with the number of buses in the system [9].
Thus, in addition to significantly reducing the cost of data
attacks, our attack framework also undermines measures of
grid resilience based on ‘hidden’ attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents a description of the system models used in
state estimation, bad-data detection and identification. The
novel adversarial attack model with jamming is introduced
in Section III along with conditions necessary for attack
feasibility. Section IV analyzes how the cost of jamming
affects the attack strategy and grid resilience and presents a
graph theoretic formulation for the optimal attack design. Our
algorithm to design an optimal attack vector is presented in
Section V. Simulations of the proposed algorithm for the range
of jamming and bad-data injection costs on IEEE bus systems
and comparisons with existing work are shown in Section VI.
Finally, concluding remarks and future directions of work are
presented in Section VII.
II. STATE ESTIMATION AND BAD-DATA DETECTION IN
POWER GRIDS
We denote the power grid by a set V of buses (nodes)
connected by a set E of transmission lines (directed edges).
Figure 1 shows the graph representation of the IEEE 14 bus
test system [14].
Measurement Model: We use DC power flow model [16]
for the grid here where nodal line voltage magnitudes and line
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Fig. 2. State Estimator for a power system [15], [16]
resistances are ignored. It is given by:
z = Hx+ e (1)
Here z ∈ Rm is the m length vector of measurements. We
consider two kinds of measurements in the grid: a) flow
measurements on lines and b) voltage phasor measurements
on buses, measured by conventional meters and phasor mea-
surement units. x ∈ Rn denotes the state vector of length
n = |V | that comprises of the phase angles at the buses in
the grid. H is the measurement matrix and e is a zero mean
Gaussian measurement noise vector with known covariance Σ.
Let the kth1 and k
th
2 entries in z represent the power flow on
line (i, j) from nodes i to j and the voltage phasor at node i
respectively. Then, z(k1) = Bij(x(i) − x(j)), z(k2) = x(i).
Here Bij is the susceptance of line (i, j). The corresponding
rows in H thus have the following structure:
H(k1) = [0..0 Bij 0..0 −Bij 0..0] (2)
H(k2) = [0..0 1 0..0] (3)
We assume m > n and full column rank of H , without
a loss of generality. Further, without a loss of generality, we
introduce a (n+ 1)th reference bus with phase angle 0 in our
system and represent it by augmenting 0 to the state vector x.
Let z include the phase angle measurement for some bus i.
Note that the angle measured can be considered equivalent to a
flow on a hypothetical line of unit conductance between bus i
and the reference bus (with phase 0). Thus, we can add an extra
binary valued column hg corresponding to the reference bus
in matrix H to get z = Hx = [H|hg]
[
x
0
]
. Here hg(k) = −1
if z(k) measures a phase angle and 0 otherwise. Observe
that after addition of the reference bus in the system, all
measurements now correspond to flow measurements. Abusing
notation, we use x and H to denoted the augmented state
vector and measurement matrices respectively from this point.
State Estimator: We consider a least-square state estimator
in the grid as shown in Figure 2 [15], [16].
The state vector estimate x∗ for a given measurement vector
z is generated by minimizing the weighted measurement resid-
ual J(x, z) = ‖Σ−.5(z − Hx)‖2 over variable x. Following
estimation, a threshold (λ) based bad-data detector determines
the presence of erroneous measurements by the following test:
‖Σ−.5(z −Hx∗)‖2 ≤ λ accept x∗
> λ detect bad-data (4)
If the test detects bad-data, the measurements are sent for
eliminating the bad-data as described below, following which
the state estimate is recomputed.
Bad-data Removal: Note that the measurement residue
vector r for measurement z and estimated x∗ is given by [15],
[16]:
r = z −Hx∗ = [I −H(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1]z (5)
with variance Rr. Assuming that each measurement is inde-
pendently affected by natural bad data, the state estimator
removes the least number of erroneous measurements such
that the resulting residual satisfies the threshold condition in
Eq. (4) while preserving full column rank in H . For a single
removal, the optimal strategy is to remove the measurement
with largest normalized residual [15]. However, for multiple
bad-data entries, the optimal removal strategy is a non-convex
problem [15], [12].
We assume in the remainder of this paper that the measure-
ment data z, in the absence of any adversarial manipulation,
is reasonably clean and capable of producing the correct state
estimate x∗ by passing the bad-data detection test.
A. Attack Models
Let a denote the injected adversarial attack vector that is
added to correct measurements in z to generate the compro-
mised measurement vector z + a. Traditional attack models
have focussed on bypassing the bad-data detector by ensuring
that the measurement residual in Eq. (4) remains unchanged
following the injection of bad-data. Mathematically, this re-
quires a = Hc 6= 0 for some c ∈ Rn as ‖Σ−.5(z−Hx∗)‖2 =
‖Σ−.5(z+a−H(x∗+c))‖2. Thus, a ‘Hidden’ Attack results
that produces an erroneous state vector x∗ + c [5]. Next we
describe ‘detectable’ data attacks [12] that are the focus of
this paper.
‘Detectable’ Data Attack: From the bad-data removal
scheme described earlier, it is clear that an attack vector
a 6= 0 will change the state estimate if removal of some
other k < ‖a‖0 measurements (distinct from the attack
vector) satisfies the bad-data detection test. For a nonzero
Hc, consider the adversarial strategy that excludes (or does
not corrupt) less than 50% of the non-zero entries in Hc
from the attack vector a. Note that a still gives a feasible
‘detectable’ attack as the non-zero terms in (Hc − a) are
identified as bad-data instead of vector a. This happens as
‖a‖0 > ‖Hc−a‖0. In the next section, we formulate in detail
the design of the optimal ‘detectable’ data attack and the use it
to analyze changes that arise due to the adversarial capability
to jam measurements.
III. ‘DETECTABLE’ ATTACK WITH MEASUREMENT
JAMMING
In a general setting, few of the measurements in the
grid may be incorruptible due to geographical isolation or
encryption. We denote this set of measurements secure from
adversarial corruption by S. Note that measurements in S
suffer from normal bad-data arising from measurement noise.
The remaining insecure measurements belong to set Sc. The
measurements included in the minimum cost ‘detectable’
attack are given by non-zero terms in the optimal vector d∗
in the following optimization problem [12]:
min
d∈{0,1}m,c∈Rn+1
‖d‖0 (P-1)
s.t. a = Hc, c 6= 0, c(n+ 1) = 0
d(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sm (secure measurements)
‖d‖0 > ‖a‖0/2 (for feasibility) (6)
rank(DH) = n, diag(D) = 1− (1− d) ∗ aspty (7)
Here, a∗b refers to the element-wise multiplication between
vector a and b, while aspty denotes the sparsity pattern in
vector a. Condition (6) ensures that the estimator removes
measurement entries corresponding to non-zero terms in (1−
d) ∗ a as bad-data, instead of the data injected in d ∗ a. D is a
diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are 0 for removed data
and 1 otherwise. DH is the measurements matrix after bad-
data removal. Condition (7) keeps it at full rank. The attack
passes the bad-data detection test as it lies in the column space
of DH . It is worth restating that as each row in augmented
H corresponds to a flow measurement, H is equivalent to
a susceptance weighted incidence matrix of a graph GH with
n+1 nodes and edges given by rows in H . Due to this structure
of H , it can be shown that [8], [9], [12] the optimal attack
a∗ = Hc corresponds to a 0− 1 binary valued nodal vector c.
Further, the optimal attack strategy for Problem P − 1 doesn’t
change if H is replaced by the un-weighted incidence matrix
AH of graph GH (AH(i, j) = 1(Hˆ(i, j) > 0) − 1(Hˆ(i, j) <
0)) as for a binary valued c, AHc and Hc have the same set
of non-zero terms (identical sparsity pattern). Note that non-
zero values in AHc actually represents cut edges in graph GH
between nodes marked 1 and 0. This leads to the following
result (Theorem 2 in [12]) for optimal attack for Problem P-1.
Theorem 1 ([12, Theorem 2]). Let C∗ denote the minimum
cardinality cut in GH with a minority of secure cut-edges
(|C∗ ∩ S| < |C∗|/2 ). An optimal ‘detectable’ attack for
Problem P-1 is given by any b1+|C∗|/2c cut-edges in C∗∩Sc
(insecure cut edges).
We ignore the proof here for space constraints. Observe
that if d is restricted to an all-1 vector, Problem P-1 reduces
to the problem of determining the optimal ‘hidden’ attack. The
optimal attack in that case is given by the minimum cardinality
cut in GH that does not include any secure edge in Sm [8],
[9].
‘Detectable Jamming’ Attack: We now analyze an ad-
versary with the capacity to jam insecure measurements in
addition to manipulating their values by bad-data injection.
Secure measurements are assumed to be Let pJ and pI be
the cost associated with jamming and bad-data injection into
an insecure measurement in the grid respectively. We assume
that 0 ≤ pI ≤ pI as the range of pJ as jamming is less
resource intensive than bad-data injection. This is a reasonable
assumption as jamming can even be conducted by introducing
garbage values through bad-data injection techniques. For ease
of elucidation, we assume that the jamming and manipulation
costs are uniform over all measurements in Sc, though all anal-
ysis follows immediately for variable costs as well. Consider
a cut C in graph GH . Let nCS and n
C
Sc denote the number of
secure and insecure edges in cut C with nCSc > n
C
S as shown
in Fig. 3. By Theorem 1, attack feasibility requires injection
into kC (kC > |C|/2) insecure edges at a cost of pIkC .
Instead, consider a different strategy where the adversary jams
kCJ insecure measurements. As jammed measurements are
not received and ignored by the control center, the cut-size
effectively reduces to |C| − kCJ . If the remaining nCSc − kCJ
insecure edges in the cut are greater in number than the nCS
secure edges, the adversary can still attack kCI ≥ 1+b |C|−k
C
J
2 c
measurements and generate a feasible attack. As depicted in
Fig. 3, the cost of this new attack is pIkCI +pJk
C
J . We term it a
‘detectable jamming’ attack to distinguish it from the original
‘detectable’ attack that doesn’t incorporate jamming.
We formulate the design of the optimal ‘detectable jam-
ming’ attack as follows:
min
dJ ,dI∈{0,1}m
pJ‖dJ‖0 + pI‖dI‖0 (P-2)
s.t. a = AHc, c ∈ {0, 1}n+1 − 0, c(n+ 1) = 0
dJ + dI ∈ {0, 1}m (8)
dJ(i) = dI(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sm (9)
‖dI‖0 > (‖a‖0 − ‖dJ‖0)/2 (for feasibility) (10)
rank(DAH) = n where diag(D) = 1− (1− dJ − dI) ∗ |a|
(11)
The non-zero values in optimal dJ and dI give the mea-
surements to jam and injection bad-data respectively in the
optimal attack. Note that in Problem P-2, we replaced H
with incidence matrix AH and made c a 0 − 1 vector as
discussed earlier. Here, condition 8 ensures data injection
and jamming cannot occur at the same measurement. The
remaining conditions arise from incorruptibility of secure
measurements (9), feasibility of ‘detectable’ attack (10) and
full system observability after bad-data removal (11). From the
discussion preceding Problem P-2, it is clear that the optimal
‘detectable jamming’ attack has a graph-cut based construction
as stated below.
Lemma 1. Let C denote a cut in GH with (nCSc > |C|/2)
insecure cut-edges. A feasible attack is given by jamming
(kCJ ≥ 0) and injecting data into (b1+(|C∗|−kCJ )/2c > 0) of
the nCSc insecure cut-edges at a cost of pJk
C
J +pIb1+(|C∗|−
kCJ )/2c. The optimal ‘detectable jamming’ attack is given by
minimizing the attack cost over variable kCJ (jammed edges)
for all feasible cuts C.
It is noteworthy that if kCJ = 0 in Lemma 1, we obtain
the optimal ‘detectable’ attack (no jamming) as a feasible
‘detectable jamming’ attack. This leads to following important
properties.
Corollary 1. • The space of system configurations with
feasible ‘detectable jamming’ attacks is identical to that
of ‘detectable’ attacks and is a superset of that of hidden
attacks.
• The cost of the optimal ‘detectable jamming’ attack is
never greater than the cost of optimal ‘detectable’ attack
and never greater than .5 + 1/|C∗h| times the cost of
optimal ‘hidden’ attack on a system, |Ch ∗ | being the
cardinality of optimal ‘hidden’ attack.
The first property arises as the set of cuts with majority
of edges in Sc (feasibility requirement of ‘detectable’ and
‘detectable jamming’ attacks) is a superset of the set of
cuts will all edges in Sc (feasibility requirement of ‘hidden’
attacks). The second property has two parts: the first part
follows from the fact that the optimal ‘detectable’ attack is
a feasible ‘detectable jamming’ attack and hence not of lower
cost that the optimal; the second part follows from the fact
that injecting bad-data into 1 + b|C∗h|c/2 measurements of
the optimal ‘hidden’ attack constitutes a feasible ‘detectable’
attack. It needs to be mentioned that these bounds reflect
comparisons in the worst-case. The simulation results in
Section VI demonstrate that the average impact of ‘detectable
jamming’ attack is much more substantial. In the next section,
we discuss the effect of jamming cost pJ on the design of the
optimal attack vector and its key properties.
IV. EFFECT OF JAMMING COST ON ATTACK
CONSTRUCTION
𝒑𝑱 ≥
𝒑𝑰
𝟐
 𝒑𝑱 <
𝒑𝑰
𝟐
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Fig. 3. Effect of jamming cost pJ and bad-data injection cost pI on the
minimum cost attack C∗ derived from a feasible cut C with nCS secure and
nCSc insecure measurements. Secure, insecure but untouched, jammed, bad-
data injected measurements in the cut are represented by red, white, blue
and green colors respectively. When pJ < pI/2, attack cost is reduced by
replacing one bad-data injection with jamming two measurements as shown in
the cuts on the left of C. For pJ ≥ pI/2, attack cost is reduced by replacing
two jammed measurements by one measurement with bad-data injection while
leaving the other untouched as shown on the right side of cut C. Optimal cuts
C∗ got from this replacement are given by Theorem 2.
As mentioned earlier, we consider the jamming cost pJ to
lie in the interval [0, pI ] where pI is the bad-data injection
cost. Consider a feasible cut C with nCSc insecure edges and
nCS secure edges in the measurement graph GH . Here n
C
Sc >
nCS as shown in Fig. 3. By Theorem 1, a feasible ‘detectable
jamming’ attack comprises of selecting (kCJ ≥ 0) and (kCI =
b1 + (|C| − kCJ )/2c > 0) insecure edges for jamming and
bad-data injection respectively, at a overall cost of pC
pC = pJk
C
J + pIb1 + (|C| − kCJ )/2c
= (pJ − pI/2)kCJ + pI
|C|+ 2− (|C| − kCJ ) mod 2
2
(12)
We divide the range of pJ into two intervals: A (pJ < pI/2)
and B (pI/2 ≤ pJ ≤ pI ). Note that in interval A, the cost pC
is a decreasing function of kCJ . Therefore, the minimum cost
attack for feasible cut C is obtained by jamming nCSc−nCS −1
(the maximum permissible number of) insecure edges . The
remaining nCS + 1 insecure edges, greater than the number of
secure edges by one, are injected with bad-data. The attack
cost is given by
pC = pJ(n
C
Sc − nCS − 1) + pI(nCS + 1)
= (pI − pJ)nCS + pJnCSc + (pI − pJ) (13)
. Ignoring constant (pI − pJ), this equals C’s cut-weight if
secure and insecure edges are given weights of (pI − pJ) and
pJ respectively. Thus, if pJ < pI/2, the optimal ‘detectable
jamming’ cut corresponds to the feasible cut C∗ with lowest
cut-weight in GH , where secure and insecure edges have
weights of (pI−pJ) and pJ respectively. Next consider interval
B (pI/2 < pJ ≤ pI ). In Eq. (12), if kCJ is reduced by
2, the (|C∗| − kCJ ) mod 2 term remains unchanged and the
overall cost pC decreases. Hence the optical attack for cut
C corresponds to either kCJ = 0 or k
C
J = 1, otherwise the
attack cost can be reduced further. Checking the contribution
of (|C∗|−kCJ ) mod 2 term manually, we note that the optimal
attack for cut C is given by (kCJ = 0, k
C
I = (1 + |C|)/2) for
odd |C|, and (kCJ = 1, kCI = |C|/2) for even |C|. In either
case, the optimal attack cost is an increasing function of the
cut-size |C| expressed below.
pC = pJ(1− |C| mod 2) + pIb(1 + |C|)/2c (14)
Thus, in interval B, the optimal ‘detectable jamming’ attack
corresponds to the feasible cut C∗ with lowest cut-size in GH .
We summarize this discussion by presenting our main theorem
for optimal ‘detectable jamming’ attack construction.
Theorem 2. The minimum cost ‘detectable jamming’ attack
for measurement graph GH with jamming cost pJ and bad-
data injection cost pI is constructed as follows.
• pJ < pI/2: Give weights of pI−pJ and pJ to secure and
insecure edges respectively in GH and find the minimum
weight feasible cut C∗ with nC
∗
S secure edges. Use
(nC
∗
S + 1) insecure measurements for bad-data injection
and jam the rest.
• pJ ≥ pI/2: Find the minimum cardinality feasible cut
C∗ in GH . Use b(1 + |C∗|)/2c insecure measurements
for bad-data injection and jam (1− |C∗| mod 2) mea-
surement.
The comparison of attack costs in ‘detectable jamming’
attacks with that of standard ‘detectable’ attacks is given by
the following.
Theorem 3. Let cut C∗ with nC
∗
S secure and n
C∗
Sc
insecure edges correspond to the optimal ‘detectable’
attack (no jamming). The cost of optimal ‘detectable
jamming’ attack satisfies the following bounds.
• For pJ < pI/2, the cost of the optimal ‘detectable jam-
ming’ attack is less than that of the optimal ‘detectable’
attack cost by at least (pI−2pJ)bn
C∗
Sc −nC
∗
S
2 c+pJ(1−|C∗|
mod 2).
• For pJ ≥ pI/2, the cost of the optimal ‘detectable
jamming’ attack is less than that of ‘detectable’ attack
by pI − pJ (if |C∗| is even), and equal otherwise.
Proof: For pJ ≥ pI/2, using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2,
it follows that the optimal cuts for ‘detectable’ and ‘detectable
jamming’ attacks are identical. The difference is costs follows
immediately from the attack construction using the optimal cut
C∗ in either case. For pJ < pI/2, note that the minimum-cost
‘detectable jamming’ attack for feasible cut C∗ is given by
injecting bad-data into nC
∗
S + 1 edges and jamming the other
insecure edges. The difference in cost between ‘detectable
jamming’ attack and ‘detectable’ attack for cut C∗ is thus:
δ = pIb1 + n
C∗
Sc + n
C∗
S
2
c − pI(nC∗S + 1)− pJ(nC
∗
Sc − nC
∗
S − 1)
= (pI − 2pJ)bn
C∗
Sc − nC
∗
S
2
c+ pJ(1− |C∗| mod 2) (15)
As C∗ is a feasible ‘detectable jamming’ attack (not necessar-
ily optimal) in this case, Eq. 15 gives a lower bound on the
difference in optimal costs.
Further, the following statements holds:
Corollary 2. • For pJ = 0 (minimum jamming cost), the
optimal ‘detectable jamming’ attack corresponds to the
cut C∗, which has the minimum number of secure edges
among all feasible cuts.
• For pJ = 0, if a ‘hidden’ attack exists, an optimal
‘detectable jamming’ attack corresponds to the same cut
C∗.
Finally, the following theorem presents the potency of
‘detectable jamming’ attacks by a lower bound on the number
of secure measurements required for complete security.
Theorem 4. A system is always vulnerable to ‘detectable
jamming’ attacks if less than half the total number of mea-
surements are secure.
Proof: Consider the graph GH generated from the mea-
surement system. A feasible ‘detectable jamming’ attack re-
quires a cut in GH with a majority of insecure edges. As
less than half of the measurements in GH are secure, there
is at least one bus connected with a majority of insecure
edges. Thus, a feasible ‘detectable jamming’ attack can be
constructed using that bus’s edges as the cut. Hence proved.
Note that Theorem 4 provides a O(|E|) lower bound
on the minimum number of secure measurements required
for complete security, that scales with the total number of
measurements. In contrast, complete protection from ‘hidden’
attacks require a maximum of |V |−1 secure measurements [5],
[9], that is much lesser that in general graphs. In Section VI,
we show simulations that confirm that ‘detectable jamming’
attacks are more resilience to presence of secure measurements
than ‘hidden’ attacks. In the next Section, we present our
algorithm to construct the optimal attack described in Theorem
2 and Corollary 2.
V. ALGORITHM FOR ATTACK CONSTRUCTION
To confirm the existence of a feasible attack, we need to
identify a feasible cut with a majority of insecure edges in
the graph. Theorem 3 in [12] proves that this is equivalent
to the ‘ration-cut’ problem, a known NP-hard problem. Thus,
the design of the optimal ‘detectable jamming’ attack, in the
worst case, is hard as well.
We now provide an approximate algorithm (Algorithm 1)
for attack vector construction. For pJ < pI/2 (interval A), we
create weighted graph GH with secure (insecure) edges having
weight pI − pJ (pJ ). For pJ ≥ pI/2 (interval B), we consider
unweighted GH . Using Theorem 2, the optimal attack, in
either case, is given by the minimum weighted feasible cut
in GH .
Working: Algorithm 1 proceeds by computing the mini-
mum weight cut C in GH (Step 1) and checks if it is a feasible
cut (Step 3). If C is infeasible, one secure edge is selected
randomly in C and its edge-weight is increased by β (Step
4). We consider two cases, one where β is taken as the secure
edge-weight and the other where it is taken as ∞. Following
the increase, the algorithm recomputes the minimum weight
cut and checks for feasibility. This process is iterated until
a feasible cut is obtained (construct the attack vector) or the
cut-weight reaches a threshold γ <∞(declare no solution).
Note that for β =∞, in the worst case, there are |S| min-
cut computations (one for each secure edge) of complexity
O(|V ||E|+|V |2 log |V |) giving the algorithm a computational
complexity of O(|S||V ||E|+|S||V |2 log |V |). However, as the
algorithm is approximate, it might not return a solution in
every case. In the next section, we show simulation results
on designing optimal attacks by Algorithm 1 in IEEE test
systems. We also demonstrate the capacity of ‘detectable
jamming’ attacks in overcoming high placement of secure
measurements in the systems considered.
VI. RESULTS ON IEEE TEST SYSTEMS
We discuss the performance of Algorithm 1 in designing
‘detectable jamming’ attacks by simulations on IEEE 14-bus
and 57-bus test systems [14]. In each simulation run, we put
flow measurements on all lines in the test system considered
and phase angle measurements on 60% (randomly selected)
Algorithm 1 ‘Detectable Jamming’ Attack Construction
Input: Graph GH with secure and insecure edges weighted
based on pJ , pI , S, Sc, β, γ
1: Compute min-weight cut C in GH
2: wC ← weight of C
3: while (wC < γ, 2|C
⋂
S| ≥ |C|) do
4: Randomly pick edge i ∈ C⋂S and increase its weight
by β
5: Compute min-weight cut C in GH
6: wC ← weight of C
7: end while
8: if 2|C⋂S| < |C| then
9: Construct attack vector using Theorem 2
10: else
11: Declare no solution
12: end if
of the system buses. Over multiple simulations, we vary the
fraction of secure measurements and record the trends in
average cost of constructing ‘detectable jamming’ attack. We
consider either interval of jamming cost (pJ = 0, pJ < pI/2
and pJ > pI/2), and different values of parameter β (finite
and ∞) in Algorithm 1. The trends in average optimal cost of
‘detectable jamming’ attacks for the 14 bus system are pre-
sented in Fig. 4 (for configurations that allow feasible ‘hidden’
attacks), and Fig. 5 (for configurations that are resilient to
‘hidden’ attacks). To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach,
we compare the trends with average costs of constructing
‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ (no jamming) attacks. Note that
while the average attack cost is way below the upper bound
(Corollary 1) in Fig. 4, it is observed to eventually decrease
with increasing secure measurements in the system. This trend
results from the fact that system configurations resilient to
attacks that increase with increasing secure measurements
are not accounted for in the plotted average attack costs.
Further, it is apparent that changing the value of β does
not affect the performance of Algorithm 1 much. Similarly,
Fig. 6 includes the average cost trends for the 57 bus system,
with β in Algorithm 1 being taken equal to the weight of
secure measurements. From the figures it is clear that jamming
enabled attacks have significantly reduced costs over both
‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ attacks. Finally, Fig. 7 plots the
increase in number of completely resilient operating regimes
(no feasible attack possible) with an increase in the number
of secure measurements in the system. It is easily evidenced
in Fig. 7 that compared to ‘hidden’ attacks, ‘detectable’ and
‘detectable jamming’ attacks pose a much greater threat to the
grid vulnerability as the number of secure operating regimes
in the latter hardly increases with an increase in the number
of secure measurements. This is in line with the security
needs highlighted in Theorem 4. The simulations prove the
dual adversarial benefits created by ‘detectable jamming’
attacks: lowering of attack cost and increased insensitivity to
deployment of incorruptible measurements.
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Fig. 4. Average cost of optimal attacks (‘hidden’, ‘detectable’ and ‘detectable
jamming’) produced for different values of β (size of secure edge and ∞)
by Algorithm 1 on the IEEE 14 bus test system with flow measurements
on all lines, phasor measurements on 60% of the buses and protection on a
fraction of measurements selected randomly. The bad-data injection cost (pI )
is taken as 1. For the ‘detectable jamming’ attack, the jamming costs (pJ )
considered are 0, 1/4(< pI/2), 3/4(> pI/2). Only configurations where
‘hidden’ attacks are possibly are considered to determine the average costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduce a new data attack framework on power grids
termed ‘detectable jamming’ attacks, where an adversary uses
measurement jamming as a tool in addition to changing meter
readings (bad-data injection). Through the use of these dual
techniques on an optimal set of measurements, the adversary
creates a violation of the bad-data detection test but still creates
a change in the estimated state vector. This is ensured by
leading the state estimator to incorrectly label uncorrupted
correct data as bad-data. We show that the design of the
minimum cost attack of this regime is shown to be equivalent
to a constrained graph cut problem that takes two different
forms, dependent on the relative values of jamming and data
injection costs. We prove that even the worst-case attack cost
of ‘detectable jamming’ attacks is approximately half of the
optimal ‘hidden’ attack cost, while the capability to overcome
incorruptible measurements is much more pronounced than
in ‘hidden’ attacks. This is highlighted by the fact that
the number of secure measurements required for complete
resilience against ‘hidden’ attack is of the order of number
of buses in the system, while complete resilience against
‘hidden’ attacks requires greater than half the measurements
to be incorruptible and scales with the number of edges in
the measurement graph. We further show that in comparison
to ‘detectable’ (no jamming) attacks, our jamming reliant
framework significantly alters the optimal attack (given by the
optimal graph cut) only if the jamming cost is less than half the
cost of bad-data injection. For values of jamming cost greater
than half the injection cost, ‘detectable jamming’ attacks have
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Fig. 5. Average cost of optimal attacks (‘detectable’ and ‘detectable
jamming’) produced for different values of β (size of secure edge and∞) by
Algorithm 1 on the IEEE 14 bus test system with flow measurements on all
lines, phasor measurements on 60% of the buses and protection on a fraction
of measurements selected randomly. The bad-data injection cost (pI ) is taken
as 1. For the ‘detectable jamming’ attack, the jamming costs (pJ ) considered
are 0, 1/4(< pI/2), 3/4(> pI/2). Only configurations which are resilient
against ‘hidden’ attacks are considered to determine the average costs.
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Fig. 6. Average cost of optimal attacks (‘detectable’ and ‘detectable
jamming’) produced by Algorithm 1 (with finite β) on the IEEE 57 bus test
system with flow measurements on all lines, phasor measurements on 60% of
the buses and protection on a fraction of measurements selected randomly. The
bad-data injection cost (pI ) is taken as 1. For the ‘detectable jamming’ attack,
the jamming costs (pJ ) considered are 0, 1/4(< pI/2), 3/4(> pI/2).
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Fig. 7. Average fraction of simulated configurations with no feasible ‘hidden’
and ‘detectable jamming’ attacks given by Algorithm 1 for different values
of β in IEEE 14 and 57 bus test systems. Each test system has flow
measurements on all lines, phasor measurements on 60% of the buses and
protection on a fraction of measurements selected randomly.
a lower attack cost but correspond to the same optimal graph
cut as ‘detectable’ attacks. As the design of the optimal
attack is NP hard in general, we present an iterative min-
cut based approximate algorithm with polynomial complexity
to determine the optimal cut. We demonstrate the adversarial
benefits of our proposed attack framework and performance
of our approximate algorithms through simulations on IEEE
test cases for different values of jamming costs and different
system conditions. This paper exposes the adverse effects to
grid security posed by measurement jamming when used as an
adversarial tool to supplement ‘bad-data’ injection. Designing
optimal security measures against this attack regime is the
object of our current research in this domain.
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